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Non-audit service fees and financial reporting quality: A meta-analysis  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this paper is to present a meta-analysis of the association between fees for non-
audit services or non-audit fees (hereafter NAF) and financial reporting quality (hereafter FRQ). 
The classic agency problem between shareholders and managers gives rise to the hiring of 
auditors who provide independent assurance to corporate stakeholders that financial statements 
prepared by corporate managers comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Auditing also plays a significant role in enforcing and protecting 
investors’ rights by detecting expropriation by insiders (Newman, Patterson and Smith, 2005) 
and benefits management by providing a signalling mechanism regarding the reliability of 
management-provided financial information. However, the discharge of such responsibilities 
requires auditors to be independent, both in fact and in appearance1. Over the years, however, the 
independence of auditors has come under increased scrutiny because of their joint provision of 
both audit and non-audit services.2 A theoretical model proposes that such non-audit services 
impair auditor independence because of the existence of client-specific future quasi rents, 
proxied by the NAF provided to the incumbent auditors (DeAngelo, 1981). The recent spate of 
corporate collapses around the world, particularly in the USA, has provided evidence for such a 
proposition, and has forced regulators to ban certain kinds of non-audit services with the 
expectation that such prohibition will increase financial reporting quality and, ultimately, 
investor confidence in the financial reporting process. Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002, for example, prohibits nine broad types of non-audit services.  
 
 The provision of non-audit services, however, provides considerable economies of scope. 
These economies of scope are broadly categorized into knowledge spillover benefits (benefits 
from transferring information and knowledge), and contractual economies (making better use of 
assets and/or safeguards already developed when contracting and ensuring quality in auditing) 
(Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka and Solomon, 1988; Arrunada, 1999). These two competing 
hypotheses have spawned a sizable volume of research investigating the association between 
NAFand FRQ. Empirical evidence from this body of research, however, remains inconclusive 
primarily because of the heterogeneity of the FRQ proxies used.  
 
 A couple of narrative literature reviews on the determinants and consequences of non-
audit services have been conducted by Beattie and Fearnley (2002) and Schneider, Church and 
Ely (2006). These authors reviewed empirical studies of (i) the nature and magnitude of non-
audit services fees; (ii) the determinants of non-audit services purchasing decisions; (iii) the 
impact of joint services provision from survey and experimental studies; (iv) the association 
                                                            
1
 It is virtually impossible to prove independence in fact because only auditors could determine whether 
independence has been compromised. This meta-analysis therefore includes research which focuses on 
independence in appearance.   
2
 Non-audit services are also referred to as management advisory services or consulting, but have a broader 
scope, in that non-audit services also include compliance-related services (such as taxation and accounting 
advice) and assurance-related services (such as due diligence and internal audit) (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002).  
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between joint provision, pricing and audit tenure; (v) the impact of non-audit services on auditor 
reporting decisions and (vi) the association between NAF and earnings quality. Francis (2004) 
and DeFond and Francis (2005) take a broader view of audit quality and come to pretty similar 
conclusions. Defond and Francis (2005) conclude that “…the overwhelming majority of research 
on non-audit fees fails to find compelling evidence that they impair audit independence” (p.14), 
which is also echoed by Francis (2004): “…at this stage one would have to say the evidence…is 
inconclusive, but there is at least the possibility that high levels of non-audit services may impair 
audit quality” (p. 357, emphasis added). Although narrative literature reviews may include a 
large number of studies on particular research themes, such reviews can be misleading and often 
inconclusive (Hunter and Schmidt 1990). In some cases there may be several studies with 
varying results that are subject to variations in sample size, time period, and setting of the study. 
As a result, different researchers may reach different conclusions about a set of individual 
studies. A narrative literature review will report these as apparently inconsistent results and call 
for further research, which may also produce inconsistent results and further cloud the issue. By 
contrast, meta-analysis statistically aggregates results across individual studies and corrects for 
statistical artefacts like sampling and measurement error and, thereby, provides much greater 
precision with respect to the findings compared with narrative reviews (Hay et al. 2006). Meta-
analysis is particularly effective in reconciling results that are inconsistent across studies like the 
effect of NAF on FRQ.  
 
 The present meta-analysis is expected to contribute to the debate concerning whether 
regulation restricting the provision of non-audit services is justifiable. The recent most 
comprehensive corporate governance law in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (hereafter 
SOX 2002) prohibited certain kinds of non-audit services. The drafters of this regulation relied 
on an important piece of academic research3 conducted by Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) 
who document that firms paying higher levels of NAF report more income-increasing abnormal 
accruals and are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts. However, subsequent studies using 
different research methodologies fail to support Frankel et al.’s findings. These contradictory 
findings call for an overall assessment of the state of the current research on the association 
between NAF and FRQ. Such an assessment is expected to inform regulators who are in the 
process of considering whether to impose sanctions on the provision of non-audit services. As 
Francis (2006, 748) notes, “…it is clear that the appropriateness of auditor-provided NAS [non-
audit services] continues to be controversial and viewed with skepticism by regulators. For this 
reason, it is important that there be ongoing research to facilitate well informed policy making by 
regulators with respect to the costs and benefits of restricting the scope of NAS to audit clients.” 
Prospective investors can use reliable meta-analysis results to assess the risk of making 
investment decisions based on accounting information audited by auditors who may have 
compromised their independence and, hence, the integrity of the financial statements because of 
the joint provision of audit and non-audit services. The importance of conducting meta-analysis 
                                                            
3Whether academic research in general and archival research in particular aids accounting regulators remains 
debatable. Holthausen and Watts (2001) criticize the vast body of value-relevance studies for failing to provide 
any insights for accounting standard-setters. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001), however, do not share this 
view. Healy and Wahlen (1999) are clearly pessimistic in their review of earnings management research for 
standard setting purposes. Defond and Francis (2005) identify significant gaps in the contemporary auditing 
research designed to influence audit regulation.           
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is further justified because there has been less such research in the accounting discipline. 
Pomeroy and Thornton (2007) identify 14 previous meta-analyses in the accounting discipline on 
internal control judgment (Trotman and Wood, 1991), accountants’ job satisfaction (Brierley, 
1999), corporate characteristics and disclosure levels (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), corporate 
social and financial performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003), and audit fees (Hay, 
Knechel and Wong, 2006).  
  
 Following the meta-analysis procedure outlined in Lipsey and Wilson (2001), this study 
provides statistical evidence that high NAF reduce FRQ, although the correlation between the 
two is quite low at 0.02. The poor correlation is attributed to the heterogeneous FRQ proxies 
used in the extant literature. Further analysis decomposing the FRQ proxies into five individual 
components reveals that high NAF result in low quality FRQ in the form of higher earnings 
management, less propensity for auditors to issue going-concern audit opinions and negative 
capital market effect of reported earnings.  Tests of homogeneity among FRQ proxies clearly 
reveal that extant archival research has used heterogeneous FRQ proxies, making it difficult to 
draw reliable inferences about the impact of NAF on FRQ. These findings indicate that 
operationalizing FRQ is a daunting task and poses a significant challenge for academic research 
designed to assist regulators in dealing with NAS issues. The paper proceeds as follows: the next 
section provides a theoretical underpinning of the impact of NAF on FRQ; section three critically 
evaluates the FRQ constructs used in the extant academic literature; the following section 
outlines the benefits of meta-analysis and describes the procedure; section five provides the 
meta-analysis results; section six outlines the implications of the meta-analysis findings and the 
final section concludes.   
 
 
2. Non audit service fees and auditor independence 
 
An important theoretical rationale for the impairment of auditor independence caused by joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services was provided by DeAngelo (1981). She coined the term 
‘quasi rent’ in the context of audit fee-setting and used this concept to theorize auditor 
independence. Incumbent auditors enjoy a comparative cost advantage over new auditors 
because the latter group must incur technological start-up costs with each audit. Clients also 
incur auditor switching costs. Both the technological and switching cost advantages allow the 
incumbent auditor to set the audit fees in a manner that generates future quasi rents for the 
incumbent auditors. Both the client and the incumbent auditor can impose real costs on the other. 
For example, the auditor could demand higher audit fees and the client could ask for clean audit 
opinion. The existence of future quasi rents, therefore, weakens the auditors’ incentives to be 
independent (DeAngelo, 1981). Subsequent empirical research relied on this theoretical notion to 
test the effect on FRQ of this quasi rent in the form of NAF.  
 
 However, opponents of DeAngelo’s (1981) theory argue that the provision of non-audit 
services actually increases audit efficiency. This argument is derived from the conjecture that 
providing both audit and non-audit services provides considerable economies of scope. These 
economies of scope are broadly categorized into knowledge spillover benefits (benefits from 
transferring information and knowledge); and contractual economies (making better use of assets 
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and/or safeguards already developed when contracting and ensuring quality in auditing) 
(Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988; Arrunada, 1999; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). Simunic (1984), 
however, cautions that efficiencies from joint production of audit and non-audit services can be 
partially appropriated as rents to the CPA firm supplier, and create a threat to independence. 
Beck et al. (1988) distinguish non-audit services into recurring and non-recurring services and 
propose that recurring non-audit services give rise to knowledge spillovers and reduce the threat 
to independence, while the opposite effect is experienced with non-recurring non-audit services. 
Another argument for non-impairment of independence is advanced by Arrunada (1999) who 
suggests that the provision of non-audit services can also increase the auditor’s investment in 
reputational capital, which the auditor is not likely to jeopardize to satisfy the demand of one 
particular client (Arrunada, 1999). Overall, these competing hypotheses have encouraged 
researchers to test for the presence of one effect over another.    
 
 Whether the mere provision of non-audit services irrespective of the amount of service 
fees obtained by the auditors will always cause impairment of independence is not clear. The 
then auditor of Enron, Arthur Andersen, pocketed about the same dollar amount of audit and 
NAF. Defond and Francis (2005, 14) take this into consideration, and argue that “While the 
dollar amount was large ($26 million), there is no evidence whatsoever that non-audit fees and 
services were a source of Andersen’s problems in the audit of Enron”. The Frankel et al. (2002) 
study which was relied upon by the drafter of the SOX 2002 uses fee ratio (NAF divided by sum 
of audit and NAF) as the primary independent variable capturing the possibility of financial 
dependence by the incumbent auditor on the client. However, if such financial dependence is the 
source of concern then the appropriate fee measure should be “total fees” paid to the auditor 
rather than the non-audit component of total fees. 
 
 Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the consequences of non-audit services, 
categorized primarily into knowledge spillover and impairment of independence effects, as 
hypothesized in the preceding discussion4. Researchers adopted three primary research 
methodologies, namely survey-based, experimental and large-sample archival research 
approaches to investigate the consequences of non-audit services.5 Archival research 
methodology has the advantage of “…incorporating all the richness of a capital market and its 
participants’ actual behavior; however, a general weakness of archival studies is that the richness 
of the environment frequently makes it difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint specific 
characteristics or situations” (Snhneider et al. 2006, 205). Archival research has used a number 
of FRQ proxies like earnings management, earnings conservatism, earnings restatement and 
going-concern opinion decisions to investigate the relationship between NAF and FRQ. Some 
                                                            
4
 Figure 1 also includes determinants of non-audit services although academic research investigating this 
question is rather limited compared with the audit fee literature.     
5
 The earliest known survey-based research was conducted by Schulte (1965) in the USA who surveyed 
financial executives about their perception of the impairment of auditor independence in the presence of 
management advisory service provisions and reported a significant negative influence of such services.  
Subsequent studies expanded the subjects surveyed as well as the type of management advisory services within 
and outside the USA (for an elaborate list of such studies, refer to Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). 
Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2003) provide experimental evidence that the disclosures of NAF help investors 
reassess auditor independence. 
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studies also disaggregated NAF into different components, e.g., audit-related NAF, tax-related 
NAF, and other NAF.    
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Archival research uses an agency theory explanation for investigating the effect of NAF on FRQ 
and argues that auditors are rational wealth maximizers who would be intentionally biased 
towards compromising audit quality in order to generate wealth for themselves. Behavioural 
literature, on the other hand, suggests that psychological heuristics unconsciously lead auditors to 
make biased judgments. Although the cause of auditor bias differs in these two streams of 
literature, the ultimate effect remains the same: “…auditors are more likely to acquiesce to client 
pressure, including pressure to allow earnings management, when the provision of nonaudit 
services generates economic rents” (Frankel et al. 2002, 75). Frankel et al. (2002) report a 
positive association between higher NAF and greater earnings management consistent with that 
hypothesis. Their finding, however, has been challenged by at least three other subsequent 
papers. Francis (2004) offers a possible explanation for this replicated research:  
 
 “The Frankel et al. (2002) paper hints at some political dimensions to accounting research. The 
 accounting establishment was upset by the Frankel et al. study, and I believe there was some 
 sympathy within the academic community to publish papers refuting their findings. Top-level 
 accounting research journals do not generally publish replications or ‘no results’ studies, yet  that is 
 what has occurred in the non-audit service areas” (p. 357).   
 
 Another FRQ proxy that received significant research attention is the impact of NAF on 
audit opinion decisions. If the joint provision of audit and non-audit services impairs auditor 
independence then it is likely that auditors would end up issuing far more unqualified audit 
reports than were warranted. In an early study, Wines (1994) reports that NAF is negatively 
associated with audit qualification.  Craswell (1997), however, fails to find any such effect. But 
Sharma and Sidhu (2001) support Wines (1994) by focusing on a sample of distressed firms. 
Subsequent research expanded the domain of FRQ by incorporating additional FRQ measures 
like earnings conservatism, earnings restatement and capital market effects. Use of alternative 
FRQ measures is desirable because there is no consensus in the academic literature as to what 
constitutes FRQ yet such heterogeneity creates a challenge for conducting meaningful meta-
analysis.       
 
3. Critical evaluation of the FRQ proxies 
Although FRQ occupies the central role in the information provision to outsiders, the precise 
definition of FRQ remains elusive. Different groups define financial accounting quality in 
different ways. The Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), a branch of the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR), provides summary evaluations of disclosure 
practices for a sample of companies, based on their aggregate disclosure efforts over a fiscal 
year. Analysts score respective companies on the basis of the timeliness, detail, and clarity of the 
information presented. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Concepts Statement 2, 
Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, defined quality as a hierarchy of 
accounting qualities, with relevance and reliability considered the primary ones. In addition, the 
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statement has a set of criteria, such as representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, 
predictive value, feedback, comparability, consistency, and timeliness. The 1994 American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Special Committee on Financial Reporting 
(the Jenkins Committee) used “quality of reported earnings” rather than the “quality of financial 
reporting” by focusing on user needs such as understanding the nature of a company’s businesses 
and performance, changes affecting the company, management’s perspective, and others 
(George, 2003). Financial reporting quality captures quality as embodied in actual accounting 
practices rather than quality of reporting standards. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) argue that 
this is desirable because much accounting practice is not determined by standards, since practice 
is more detailed than standards and standards often fail to keep pace with development in 
accounting practices. Furthermore, regulatory initiatives to increase financial reporting quality, 
capture only the mandated reporting quality, while financial reporting quality is also influenced 
by managers’ or shareholders’ incentives.     
 In considering financial reporting quality, the overwhelming majority of research has 
focused on earnings quality. Earnings are widely used as a key performance indicator of business 
success, commonly employed in compensation and debt arrangements. A recent comprehensive 
survey of Chief Financial Officers (CFO) by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) show the 
GAAP earnings number, especially the earnings per share (EPS), is the key metric upon which 
the market focuses. This is mainly because, for evaluating a firm’s performance, investors need a 
simple benchmark, like EPS, that reduces the costs of information processing (Graham et al., 
2005, p. 21). Also, valuation theory has long posited a relationship between earnings and the 
value of common stock (Miller & Modigliani 1966, Graham, Dodd and Cottle 1962). The most 
widely used earnings quality measure is some form of abnormal accruals measure as estimated 
by popular models like Jones (1991) and extended by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995). 
Following the agency-theory relationship developed earlier, auditors are more likely to acquiesce 
to client pressure, including pressure to allow earnings management, when the provision of non-
audit services generates economic rents.6 Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
 
H1: Firms paying high NAF will report more income-increasing abnormal  accruals than their 
 low NAF counterparts.  
 
However the reliability of the abnormal accruals models used in the extant literature is 
questionable. Unfortunately there is no best accruals model available in the extant literature and 
researchers usually validate the robustness of the findings by using alternative accruals models 
(Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Another major problem with using abnormal accruals as 
a proxy for opportunistic earnings management is that managers could also use discretionary 
accruals as an efficient contracting device to provide credible signals to the marketplace about 
the future growth prospects of the organizations. However, earnings management-based 
accounting literature generally theorizes opportunistic motives for using abnormal accruals. 
                                                            
6
 Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) find that high quality audits proxied by Big 5 auditors 
constrain managerial opportunistic earnings management behaviour. However, they do not investigate the 
moderating effect of fee ratio.   
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Furthermore managers could manipulate accounting information using a combination of accruals 
management, real activities manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006), and classification shifting 
(McVay 2006) mechanisms.  
 
 Another earnings quality measure that has attracted significant research attention is 
earnings conservatism. Researchers use the notion of conservatism to imply conditional 
conservatism which requires a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad 
news in financial statements (Basu, 1997). This timely loss recognition property mitigates 
agency problems between shareholders and managers (Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner, 2009).  
The choice of conditional conservatism as an earnings quality measure is appropriate in an audit 
setting because auditors are expected to influence timely recognition of bad news choices. 
Because published financial statements are a joint product of managers' representations and the 
audit process, earnings quality represented by the conditional conservatism property would also 
be expected to reflect audit quality (Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor, 2006). Because NAF are 
widely believed to contain higher profit margins than traditional audit services, auditors 
receiving high NAF may therefore be less inclined to issue conditionally conservative financial 
statements and hence compromise the integrity of financial statements. Therefore the following 
hypothesis is formulated:    
 
H2: Firms paying high NAF will produce less conditionally conservative financial statements 
 compared with their low NAF counterparts.   
 
 The conditional conservatism measure, however, has been challenged from different 
quarters. One common argument against this measure is that it proxies for some other properties 
of firms and/or financial reporting because of a negative relation between the conservatism 
measure and the market-to-book ratio and, hence, biases the asymmetric timeliness coefficient. 
Another serious concern is raised by Dietrich, Muller and Reidl (2007) who argue that the model 
is mis-specified, and produces biased coefficients because causality runs from earnings to returns 
and not the other way as modelled in Basu (1997). However, Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2009) 
provide an econometric analysis of the Basu (1997) conservatism measure and conclude that 
these challenges are misconstrued.  
 
 Going-concern audit opinion has been used as another proxy for the FRQ. Unlike 
earnings management and earnings conservatism which reflect actual reported numbers, going-
concern opinion is provided by the auditors by taking into consideration a large number of 
factors including quality of earnings before issuing such opinions. Issuance of a going-concern 
opinion is a matter of considerable importance to the auditors because such opinions could lead 
to company bankruptcy (the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy feature). With respect to the effect 
of NAF on the auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern audit reports, it is hypothesized that 
high levels of NAF could make the auditors financially dependent on the client and, hence, 
prevent them from issuing such opinions. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Auditors receiving high NAF will be less inclined to issue going-concern audit opinions 
 compared with their low NAF counterparts, after controlling for firm and audit specific 
 characteristics.  
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 Another financial reporting quality proxy that has recently become a matter of considerable 
concern for financial reporting regulators is earnings restatement. The US General Accounting 
Office (GAO, 2003) documents a total of 919 restatements from January 1997 to June 2002. 
Academic research reveals that restating firms lose about 10% of the market value on the day of 
such announcements (Palmrore, Richardson and Scholz, 2004). Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson 
(2007) report a positive association between stock-based compensation arrangements and 
subsequent earnings restatements. In the audit context, regulators and legislators presume that 
non-audit services compromise auditor independence, lead to lower quality audits and reviews, 
and increase the likelihood of financial reporting that violates the GAAP. Some of these 
violations are likely to be revealed through restatements of financial statements (Kinney et al., 
2002). The following hypothesis is, therefore, developed:  
 
H4: Firms paying high NAF are more likely to restate their financial statements compared with 
 their low NAF counterparts.     
 
 Another FRQ proxy that has been used in the extant literature is the capital market 
perception of the reported earnings information. The underlying premise is that if investors 
perceive audit independence to be impaired in the face of extensive NAF, “…[they] will place 
less reliance on the auditors’ attestation of it’s client’s financial statements, and perceive greater 
noise in the client’s reported earnings” (Krishnan, Sami and Zhang, 2005). Consequently the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) of such firms will be lower than for firms who pay less NAF 
to incumbent auditors. The following hypothesis tests this conjecture:   
 
H5: ERC will be lower for firms paying high NAF compared with their low NAF counterparts.      
 
   
4. Methods   
 
4.1 Search for relevant studies  
 
I performed an exhaustive search via ABN-INFO, SSRN, existing literature reviews, and internet 
sources to identify potential studies to be included for this meta-analysis. One important 
consideration for any meta-analysis is whether unpublished working papers should be included 
along with published studies. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) included unpublished working 
papers arguing that, “…aggregating both published and unpublished results adumbrates potential 
implications of statistically non-significant results, mitigating publication and replication bias” 
(p.312). I, however, excluded unpublished working papers before 2006 because those working 
papers are unlikely to get published, and are also less comparable with recent findings.     
  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The combined search resulted in 47 papers including 4 unpublished papers and nearly 89,300 
sample observations. The bulk of the papers included in the present meta-analysis addresses the 
effect of NAF on earnings management (fourteen studies including one unpublished working 
papers), going-concern audit opinion (fourteen studies including one unpublished working paper) 
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and capital market perception of reported earnings studies (eight studies including one 
unpublished working paper). 
 
4.2 Criteria for relevance  
 
The studies included for this meta-analysis had the following characteristics. First, the studies 
examined the relationship between NAF and FRQ quantitatively. The reported statistics did not 
have to be a Pearson’s product-moment correlation r, but could also be a t-statistic or p-value. 
Second, the studies specified which component of the FRQ they were trying to measure 
unambiguously. Third, two relevant studies for this meta-analysis by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
and Gul, Jaggi and Krishnan (2007) could not be included because they provided significance 
levels but neither p-values nor t-statistics. An additional study excluded was Lim and Tan 
(2008)’s, because their study appeared twice under both the earnings management and going-
concern categories of the FRQ and the authors used PRNAU as the independent variable: defined 
as the percentile rank of a particular client’s NAF given all NAF received by the audit firm. Two 
other studies by Basioudis et al. (2008) and Geiger and Rama (2003) in the going-concern 
opinion and NAF category were also excluded because of different NAF proxies used. A final 
sample of 42 studies is included in the meta-analysis. 
  
4.3 Meta-analysis procedures 
  
The purpose of this meta-analysis is to determine (i) the net effect of NAF on FRQ; and (ii) 
whether there is homogeneity in the FRQ proxies used in the extant literature. The following 
standard meta-analysis procedures as suggested by Lipsey and Wilson (2001) are performed to 
fulfill these objectives.  
  
Step 1: Convert test statistics, such as p-values or t-statistics reported in different studies to a 
standard correlation measure called effect size. The majority of the studies canvassed for meta-
analysis in this paper reported p-values. Reported p-values are converted into t-statistics, and 
effect size then is calculated as follows: 
 
dft
tES
+
=
2
 
Step 2: Compute mean effect size using weighting factors based on assumptions regarding the 
 homogeneity of variances across studies.  
 
Step 3: Test the homogeneity hypothesis in 2 above.  
 
 While conducting this meta-analysis a number of adjustments had to be made. First, the 
independent variable, auditor independence, is proxied in the published studies by a number of 
alternative fee constructs. The most widely used proxy is the fee ratio defined as NAF divided by 
sum of audit and non audit fees. Other proxies include log of NAF, total fee (sum of audit and 
NAF), and components of NAF, e.g. audit-related fee ratio, tax ratio, and other fee ratios. Given 
the popularity of fee ratios, the present meta-analysis includes all studies that adopted this 
construct as the primary independent variable to proxy auditor independence. However, 
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Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argued that the fee ratio does not capture the economic importance of the 
client when total client fees are immaterial to the audit firms. Therefore, as a supplementary 
analysis, meta-analysis results using total fee as the independence proxy has also been provided. 
With respect to the components of NAF, tax ratio has been selected as the primary construct for 
auditor independence because the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is of 
the opinion that provision of tax services would be viewed most negatively by the market 
participants.   
 
 Another difficulty associated with conducting meaningful meta-analysis relates to the 
heterogeneity of the FRQ proxies used. For example, when considering earnings management, 
some researchers used discretionary accruals in the primary analysis and the propensity of 
managers to meet or beat earnings targets (benchmark beating phenomena) in the supplementary 
analysis as proxies for FRQ (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Dee et al. 2006). I 
included discretionary accruals results only because of their extensive use in the academic 
literature as the earnings management proxy and the concern that benchmark beating does not 
represent actual earnings management but rather is a manifestation of statistical artifact 
(Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 2005, 2009). 
 
5. Results  
 
Table 2 reports the effect size measures of the selected studies and Figure 2 graphs such effect 
size for three broad FRQ proxies. The effect size measure is an essential feature of meta-analysis 
which “…produces a statistical standardization of the study findings such that the resulting 
numerical values are interpretable in a consistent fashion across all the variables and measures 
involved” (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p.4). Effect size calculations for studies that reported t-
statistics was straightforward using the procedure outlined in section 3 above. The majority of 
the selected studies, however, reported p-values, and those values therefore had to be converted 
into t-statistics. To do that I used two-tailed t-values from the t-distribution table in Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001). Table 2 also reports effect sizezr which is the transformed correlation and standard 
error (SE) of the distribution using the following formula: 
 






−
+
=
r
r
rz ES
ES
ES
1
1log5.0  
I coded every study effect size as positive if it supported the expectation that NAF are negatively 
associated with FRQ. For example, studies documenting a positive association between earnings 
management and NAF imply low quality FRQ. On the other hand, studies documenting a 
negative association between NAF and unexpected earnings also imply low quality FRQ. If I had 
taken the original signs reported in the study then it would fail to capture the fact that both these 
groups of studies provide evidence that high NAF reduce FRQ. Therefore, to be consistent with 
the underlying interpretation, I coded every effect size as positive if it supported the hypothesis 
that high NAF reduce FRQ, even though the actual coefficient signs reported in the original 
studies could show otherwise. Reported results in table 2 reveal that there is a positive 
association between NAF and FRQ, implying that high NAF reduce FRQ. The correlation, 
however, is quite low at 0.02 with a standard error of 0.0033. The test of statistical significance 
reveals that the Z-statistic is 6.06 which is significant at better than the 1% level.   
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[TABLE 2 and FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Looking at the confidence interval of the effect size distribution, it is concluded that there is a 
0.95 probability that the true association between NAF and FRQ is between 0.014 and 0.026. 
Cohen (1977, 1978, cited in Lipsey and Wilson, 2001) reported a general rule of thumb statistic 
for interpreting effect size values with effect size less than or equal to 0.20 representing the small 
range (analogous values for the correlation effect size is 0.10). The very low correlation reported 
in the present meta-analysis supports the conjecture that the association between NAF and FRQ 
is inconclusive. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) reported an average effect size of -0.08 in their 
meta-analysis of the effect of audit committee independence on FRQ. This, too, is rather low 
according to Cohen’s statistics. In the present meta-analysis, the effect size associated with the 
impact of NAF on earnings management is generally positive (eight out of the fourteen studies 
report positive effect size statistics). All the USA studies investigating the association between 
NAF and earnings management except the one by Koh, Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2009) use data 
from the post 2000 period when the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated 
disclosures of NAF data. Koh et al. (2009) argue that this may have weakened such an 
association because of time-period specific confounding effects. The authors use NAF data 
disclosed during 1978-80 period to provide a cleaner test of the impact of NAF on earnings 
management. They fail to find any evidence that NAF compromise FRQ. 
 
 Eight out of the fourteen studies on the association between NAF and audit opinion report 
a negative effect size. Earlier research on the impact of NAF on audit opinion decisions 
supported the impairment of independence hypothesis because auditors receiving high NAF 
provide clean reports even in cases when going-concern reports were warranted (Sharma and 
Shidhu, 2001). However, in a recent study in the USA, Callaghan et al. (2009) actually report 
that audit firms receiving higher tax-related NAF provide more accurate going-concern 
assessments. Only two studies investigate the effect of NAF on earnings conservatism using 
Basu (1997)-type conservatism measure, which is gaining popularity as an important earnings 
quality measure. Neither Ruddock et al. (2005) in Australia nor Zhang and Emanuel (2008) in 
New Zealand find any evidence that high NAF reduce earnings conservatism. Earnings 
restatement research is also very limited and again there is no evidence of impairment of 
independence. Cahan and Zhang (2006) investigate whether after the demise of Arthur Andersen, 
successor auditors required more conservative accounting for their ex-Andersen clients to 
minimize litigation risk. However, they use abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings 
conservatism and find a negative association between the fee ratio and abnormal accruals. More 
robust evidence has been obtained from studies that investigate capital market perception effect 
of firms receiving high NAF. For example, Krishnan et al. (2005) document a negative ERC for 
firms receiving high NAF, indicating that investors perceive such higher fees as a threat to 
independence. Similar evidence is provided by Gul et al. (2006) in the Australian market. With 
respect to market pricing of corporate debt, Brandon et al. (2004) find that the amount of NAF 
received by the external auditor negatively affects the corporate bond ratings. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2008) also provide evidence consistent with Brandon et al. (2004).  
 
 Figure 2 plots the effect size associated with earnings management, audit opinion and 
capital market effect components of FRQ. As is evident from the figure, effect size associated 
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with audit opinion studies are much more skewed (unevenly distributed) than the other two 
groups. One reason for such an uneven distribution is small sample sizes with high stat-values 
(e.g., Mishra et al., 2005).  
 
5.1 Test of heterogeneity among FRQ proxies   
 
An important consideration in conducting meta-analysis is to determine whether the various 
effect sizes that are averaged into a mean value, are estimating the same population effect size. 
According to Lipsey and Wilson (2001, 115), “…in a homogenous distribution an individual 
effect size differs from the population mean only by sampling error. A statistical test that rejects 
the null hypothesis of homogeneity indicates that the variability of the effect sizes is larger than 
would be expected from sampling error and, therefore, each effect size does not estimate a 
common population mean”. The homogeneity of variance test is based on the Q statistic, which 
is distributed as a chi-square with k-1 degrees of freedom where k is the number of effect sizes. 
The formula to calculate Q is given below: 
 
2)(∑ −= ESESwQ ii , 
 
Where effect sizei (ES) is the individual effect size for i=1 to k, and ES  is the weighted mean 
effect size over the k effect sizes, and wi is the individual weight for effect sizei. The reported Q 
statistic in Table 2 is 220.26 which is highly significant (the critical value is 74.75 at the p=0.001 
level, with 41 degrees of freedom) and strongly rejects the homogeneity hypothesis suggesting 
that that the FRQ proxies used in the extant literature do not measure the same underlying 
construct.  
 
 To further explore the source of such heterogeneity, I conduct an analysis of between-study 
variability as suggested by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008, 316): 
 
• Group the financial reporting proxies into common categories (for example earnings 
management studies) 
• Calculate an overall effect size for each FRQ group following the effect size calculation 
procedure outlined above.  
• Calculate a Q-statistic for each group and test the homogeneity of variances assumption 
for each group.  
• Sum the Q-values across all individual groups to obtain a within-group Q; then subtract 
the within-group Q from the overall Q-value obtained by the homogeneity of variances 
test to obtain a between-group Q measure.  
• Observe whether the between-group Q (i.e. the variability due to differences in FRQ 
proxies across the literature) accounts for a significant proportion of the overall 
variability across studies.  
 
 Table 3 presents the between-study variability result for five groups, and allows for 
testing the hypotheses developed in section 3. The mean effect size of the studies investigating  
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
the association between earnings management and NAF is 0.011 and is statistically significant, 
thereby supporting hypothesis 1. Looking at the confidence interval of the effect size 
distribution, it is concluded that there is 0.95 probability that the true association between 
earnings management and NAF is between -0.0012 and 0.022. The auditors’ going-concern 
opinion-based FRQ proxy provides an overall effect size of 0.0325 which is statistically 
significant at better than the 1% level, thus, supports H2. The true association between NAF and 
this FRQ proxy is 0.015 and -0.15. Earnings conservatism and NAF research produces a negative 
effect size of -0.03 which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This negative effect size 
implies that NAF does not reduce FRQ as proxied by earnings conservatism. The true 
association is between -0.017 and 0.045. However, only two studies have investigated the 
association between NAF and the earnings conservatism-based FRQ proxy using Basu (1997)-
type conservatism measure. Therefore, unlike earnings management and going-concern opinion-
based FRQ proxies, earnings conservatism research needs further validation. Earnings 
restatement research does not support the proposition that high NAF results in increased earnings 
restatements. The overall effect size is -0.03 with the true association being between 0.02 and -
0.08.  Therefore both hypotheses 3 and 4 are rejected.  
 
 The most robust evidence regarding an association between NAF and an FRQ proxy 
comes from studies that investigate the stock market valuation of earnings conditional on 
auditors receiving higher NAF. Evidence strongly suggests that investors perceive higher NAF 
as a threat to independence, and penalizes earnings of such firms. The overall effect size is 0.04 
(recall that a positive effect size implies compromise of audit independence) with a highly 
significant z-statistic of 7.70. The true association is between 0.03 and 0.05. Hypothesis five is 
therefore strongly supported. Of all the capital market-based studies only Nam (2006) concludes 
that high NAF do not compromise auditor independence and, if anything, actually decrease 
information risk because of the knowledge spillover effect. Consistent with this conjecture, Nam 
(2006) documents a negative association between NAF and the cost of capital after controlling 
for financial statement quality. Two studies investigate the bond market effect of higher NAF 
and reach the conclusion that bond investors also consider high NAF to be a threat to 
independence. However, they report coefficients which are opposite in sign. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2008) measure the costs of debt using yield on the first bond issue where the higher the yield the 
higher the cost of debt. On the other hand, Brandon et al. (2004) use Moody’s bond rating as a 
proxy for cost of debt, where a higher score represents a stronger bond rating. What this suggests 
is not only heterogeneity among FRQ proxies but also intra-group-heterogeneity. The results 
indicate that assigning FRQ proxies to five groups accounts for roughly 10% of the variability in 
the overall effect size (based on a comparison between between-group Q and overall Q derived 
from the homogeneity test).   
 
 Table 3 also reports the Q statistics (homogeneity of variance test value) for each 
component of FRQ proxies. Test of homogeneity o variance for each group reveals that earnings 
management (reported Q stat of 44.39, is significantly larger than the critical chi square value at 
p=0.001 for 13 df of 34.53), audit opinion (reported Q stat of 90.02, is significantly larger than 
the critical chi square value at p=0.001 for 13 df of 34.53) and capital market effect (reported Q 
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stat of 46.63, is significantly larger than the critical chi square value at p=0.001 for 7 df. of 
24.32) of FRQ proxies violates the homogeneity of variance assumption. This finding is in 
contrast to Pomeroy and Thornton (2008, 316) analysis which “…yields a total of six groups that 
do not violate the homogeneity of variance assumption, ranging from the highest quality proxies 
such as cumulative abnormal returns to the lowest quality proxies such as earnings restatement.” 
This implies that empirical research on the association between NAF and FRQ proxies give rise 
to significant intra-group heterogeneity with respect to the actual findings. Because of the 
significant intra-group heterogeneity, between group Q (30.1) derived by subtracting within-
group Q (sum of Q values reported in Table 3 which is 190.16) from the overall Q value reported 
in Table 2 (homogeneity test value of 220.26) explains only 14% of the variability (30.1/220.26) 
in the overall effect size.   
 
 Finally as a sensitivity analysis, Table 4 reports the effect size results from using total fee 
rather than fee ratio as the fee construct. As mentioned earlier, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) criticize 
fee ratio as the valid proxy for auditor independence because this measure fails to consider the 
economic significance of total fees. Table 4 reports that the overall effect size is only 0.0088 and 
is statistically insignificant.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The test of homogeneity again suggests that there is significant heterogeneity of variances across 
the measurements employed to proxy for FRQ (component analysis used three proxies). Within 
and between group-Q analysis suggests that between group Q explains about 34% of the overall 
variability.  
 
6. Implications   
6.1 Implications for the regulators 
How does this meta-analysis inform regulators regarding the desirability of restricting auditor-
provided non-audit services to the clients? Regulators, particularly in the USA, seem convinced 
that the provision of non-audit services impairs auditor independence, and therefore the SEC 
went on to restrict certain kinds of non-audit services through the enactment of the SOX-2002. 
However, this meta-analysis contradicts such drastic regulatory action by revealing that the 
overall impact of NAF on FRQ is negligible. This seems consistent with the concerns expressed 
by Holmstorm and Kaplan (2003) that the bigger risk facing the US governance system is the 
possibility of over-regulation in response to the spate of corporate collapses occurred in 2001. 
Romano (2005) argues that regulation of non-audit services was pushed as a political agenda, 
even though the academic evidence suggests that non-audit services did not compromise auditor 
independence. However, the robust evidence obtained from capital market studies that document 
a significant negative association between NAF and unexpected earnings lends support to the 
SEC’s concern about the adverse consequences of high NAF. However, as mentioned 
previously, heterogeneous use of FRQ proxies does undermine the importance of such research 
in informing regulators.  
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6.2 Implications for future research  
The earnings quality metrics used in the extant research are all justifiable. However, the 
reliability of such measures needs to be subjected to additional tests. Future research could 
examine the association between NAF and balance sheet-based FRQ measures as proposed by 
Barton and Simko (2002). With the availability of disaggregated NAF data, an exciting avenue 
for future research would be to link different categories of NAF with FRQ measures based on a 
careful theorization of the possible impact of such disaggregated NAF.     
 Heterogeneity in FRQ proxies has been identified as the primary driver behind the poor 
correlation observed between NAF and FRQ proxies. Future research should investigate whether 
such heterogeneity is desirable. Hunter and Schmidt (1990), argue that broad constructs like 
FRQ can and should be operationalized in a number of ways, as long as they are informed by 
rigorous theoretical underpinnings. Why does this heterogeneity exist with respect to the 
operationalization of the FRQ construct? Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) identify publication bias 
and accounting researcher incentives as the two most important drivers of diversity and 
inconsistency in selecting the dependent variable, FRQ in this case. The authors state that (2008, 
319), “…even when we include all known studies of AC [audit committee] effectiveness to date, 
both published and unpublished, we cannot reliably aggregate across all of them because of 
significant inconsistencies in defining the construct ‘financial reporting quality’ and a relative 
absence of studies designed to replicate, and thereby enhance confidence in, the results of 
previous studies” (emphasis added).  However, replication bias is less pronounced in NAF and 
FRQ literature. An example is a number of replication studies (at least three) documenting no 
association between NAF and FRQ in response to Frankel et al.’s (2002) original study which 
documented that auditors receiving higher NAF allow managers to engage in earnings 
manipulation practices. Another example of the absence of such publication bias relates to the 
effect of NAF on auditor reporting decisions. This stream of research generally provides 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that high NAF compromises auditor independence by 
making auditors more inclined to issue clean audit reports even when a qualified audit report is 
justified. Researcher incentives, on the other hand, seem to constrain successful meta-analysis in 
the NAF and FRQ domains as is consistent with Pomeroy and Thornton (2008). Successful 
researchers need to differentiate themselves by proposing and testing novel and innovative 
measures of FRQ proxies. However, in doing so, they run the risk of moving away from the 
mainstream, even though the reliability of the findings from the mainstream could have been 
questioned (Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver, 2000).       
 Meaningful interpretation of the present meta-analysis is further complicated by the fact 
that there is yet to be any consensus on which fee variable truly captures compromise of audit 
independence. The popular fee construct has been the fee ratio, which measures NAF as a 
percentage of total fees. This ratio, however, fails to consider the economic significance of total 
fees and has, therefore, been criticized as a valid measure of the economic bond between the 
auditor and the client. Further research should be undertaken to explore the theoretical rationales 
for using one fee measure over the other.  
 Another shortcoming of the studies included for meta-analysis is the piecemeal approach 
adopted by researchers for addressing the relationship between NAF and FRQ. For example, 
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capital market effect studies investigated the market reaction to unexpected earnings as 
conditional on NAF level. The underlying theory is that the market considers such earnings as 
tainted and penalizes accordingly. However, this assumption will be supported only when the 
discretionary accruals component of earnings is negatively priced for firms with high NAF. But 
earnings management research does not provide overwhelming evidence of firms with high NAF 
engaging in more earnings manipulation. Additionally, managers could use discretionary 
accruals for both opportunistic as well as efficient contracting purposes. Income increasing 
discretionary accruals allowed by audit firms with high NAF do not necessarily imply 
dysfunctional behaviour by corporate managers. Market reaction would be a nice setting to test 
these propositions.  
 
7. Concluding remarks  
It has been well documented that auditing serves as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. However, audit quality has come under serious scrutiny because of the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services, and regulators consider such services to be a threat to 
auditor independence. A sizable volume of archival research has developed over the years to 
address whether such a presumption is supported by actual data. The purpose of this paper was to 
conduct a systematic meta-analysis to provide a statistical assessment of the association between 
NAF and FRQ. Meta-analysis is superior to narrative literature review, because the former 
aggregates results across individual studies statistically and corrects for statistical artefacts like 
sampling and measurement error, thereby providing much greater precision with respect to the 
findings compared with narrative reviews. Meta-analysis results reveal that there is some 
justification for regulators’ concern over increasing NAF, as high NAF are perceived to be a 
threat to auditor independence from capital market participants. The overall correlation between 
NAF and FRQ, however, is found to be very low and is primarily attributed to heterogeneous 
FRQ proxy use in the extant literature. Of the five FRQ proxies, capital market effect exhibited 
the strongest correlation with the NAF measure. The earnings management proxy routinely used 
as the primary indicator of independence impairment due to NAF, exhibits a much lower 
association. This meta-analysis is expected to inform regulators about the desirability of 
restricting the provision of non-audit services by auditors. The findings imply that regulators 
may have put undue importance on restricting non-audit services, and in so doing may have 
limited potential benefits derived from the knowledge spillover effects associated with such 
services.   
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Figure 1: Domain of meta-analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impairment of independence as 
reflected in financial reporting 
quality (FRQ) measures  
Knowledge spillover effect 
derived from economies of 
scope (difficult to test using 
archival approach)  
Earnings management proxied by DACCR 
(Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al, 2002; 
Reynolds et al., 2004; Chung and Kallapur 
2004; Ferguson et al. 2004) 
Going-concern audit 
opinion (Wines, 1994; 
DeFond et al. 2002) 
Earnings conservatism 
/restatement (Ruddock et al. 
2005; Agrawal & Chada, 2005) 
Capital market pricing effect 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2008, Brandon 
et al. 2004; Krishnan et al.2005). 
Determinants of non-audit 
services (NAS)  
 
Provision of NAS 
by auditors and 
associated fees 
Consequences of Non-
audit fees   
Survey-based research on the perception 
of impairment of independence because of 
provision of NAS  
Behavioural research 
of NAS effect on user 
perception  
Archival research using secondary 
data  
Components of NAF 
Audit-related fee ratio (ARFRATIO) 
Tax-related fee ratio (TAXRATIO) 
Other fee ratio (OTHRATIO) 
Fee constructs: 
FEERATIO, TOTALFEE 
23 
 
Table 1: Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Author & year Sample size Country Dependent variable Independent variable Statistics  Findings 
NAF and earnings management (common proxy DACCR) 
Frankel et al. 
(2002) 
2,472 firm-years  
 
USA DACCRa 
 
FEERATIO  0.01 
 
Positive and significant    
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) 
3,069 firm-years  
 
USA  Performance 
adjusted |DCACCR|b  
 
FEERATIO  
 
0.02 
 
Positive and significant  
 
Chung and 
Kallapur (2004) 
1,853 firm-years  USA |DACCR| FEERATIO  1.52  Positive but insignificant   
 
Larcker &  
Richardson 
(2004)  
5,103 firm-years  USA |DACCR| FEERATIO  
 
1.69  Positive and marginally 
significant   
 
Reynolds et al. 
(2004)c 
2,507 companies  USA |DACCR| FEERATIO 
 
0.23 Negative and insignificant 
Ferguson et al. 
(2004) 
610  firm-years  
 
United 
Kingdom 
|DCACCR|d 
  
FEERATIO  
 
0.001 
 
Positive and significant.   
  
Antle et al. 
(2006) 
2294 firm-years United 
Kingdom 
|DACCR| FEERATIO   2.47  Positive and significant 
Magdy (2006)e 996 firm-years   USA |DACCR| FEERATIO 
 
0.002 Positive and significant 
Dee et al. 
(2006)f 
384 firms  
 
 
USA Performance adjusted 
|DCACCR| 
FEERATIO 
 
0.60 
 
Negative and insignificant 
Huang et al. 
(2007)g 
6,891 firm-years 
 
 
USA 
 
Performance 
adjusted CAACR+ 
 
TAXRATIOe 
 
 
0.12 
 
Negative and insignificant 
 
Coulton et al. 
(2007) 
4,021 firm-year   Australia |DACCR| FEERATIO  
 
 
0.85  
 
Negative and insignificant  
 
 Habib & Islam 
(2007) 
530 firm-years  
 
Bangladesh DACCRf 
 
FEERATIO 0.47  
 
Negative and insignificant 
 
Mitra (2007) 71 firms USA |DACCR| FEERATIO 0.24 Positive but insignificant  
Koh, Rajgopal 
and Srinivasan 
(2009) 
1260 firm-years USA |DACCR| FEERATIO -0.76 Negative and insignificant 
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Audit opinion/ Auditor ratification decisions  
Wines (1994) 76 listed firms  Australia Audit qualifications  FEERATIO -1.83  Negative and significant  
Craswell 
(1997) 
3,441 firm-years  Australia An indicator variable for going-concern 
opinion 
FEERATIO 0.79  Positive but insignificant 
Lennox (1999) 2,266 firm-years  UK An indicator variable for qualified opinion  FEERATIO  2.15 
 
Positive and significant   
Sharma & 
Shidhu (2001) 
49 bankrupt firms  Australia An indicator variable for going-concern 
opinion 
FEERATIO 0.049  Negative and significant  
DeFond et al. 
(2002) 
1,158 financially 
distressed firms  
USA An indicator variable for going-concern 
opinion 
FEERATIO  0.49  Negative and insignificant 
 
Firth (2002) 1,112 firm-years UK An indicator variable for qualified opinion FEERATIO -1.96 
 
 
Negative and significant 
 
Raghunandan 
(2003) 
172 firm-years USA  Proportion of shares voted against and 
abstained from the selection of the auditor. 
FEERATIO 3.92  Positive and significant 
Mishra et al. 
(2005) 
248 firms USA Vote: Percent of votes against auditor TAXRATIO 7.78 Positive and significant 
Hay et al. 
(2006) 
643 firm-years  
 
New 
Zealand 
Audit qualifications 
 
FEERATIO 0.52 Negative and insignificant 
  
Pe et al. (2006) 627 firm-years Australia GC opinion FEERATIO -1.67 Negative and significant 
 
Robinson 
(2008) 
209 bankruptcy 
filing firms 
USA An indicator variable for going concern 
opinion 
TAXRATIO 0.05 Positive and significant   
Fargher and 
Jiang (2008) 
5,113 firm-years Australia GC|PGC= indicator variable coded 1 if a 
client receives actual GC given a PGC 
FEERATIO  0.003 Negative and significant  
Callaghan et al. 
(2009) 
92 firms USA An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm 
receives a GC opinion, zero otherwise. 
FEERATIO 0.51 Positive and insignificant   
Liu et al. 
(2009) 
194 firm-years USA Proportion of shares voted against and 
abstained from the selection of the auditor. 
FEERATIO 3.60 Positive and significant  
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Earnings conservatismh 
Ruddock et al. 
(2005) 
3,746 firm-years  Australia News-dependent conservatism 
measure of Basu (1997).  
FEERATIO 
  
1.23  Positive but not significant 
 
 Cahan and 
Zhang (2006) 
1,639 firm-years USA Unadjusted abnormal accruals  FEERATIO -2.26 Negative and significant 
Zhang and 
Emanuel (2008) 
352 firm-years New 
Zealand 
News-dependent conservatism 
measure of Basu (1997). 
FEERATIO -0.95  Negative but insignificant  
Earnings restatement 
Kinney et al. 
(2004) 
934 firm years USA RESTATE equals 1 if restated, 0 
otherwise. 
TAXRATIO 0.04 Negative and significant  
Agrawal & 
Chada (2005) 
318 firm-years USA RESTATE equals 1 if restated, 0 
otherwise. 
FEERATIO 0.15  
 
Positive but not significant 
 
Bloomfield 
&Shackman 
(2008) 
500 firm-years  USA Restatement probability FEERATIO -0.56 Negative but insignificant   
Capital market perception studies 
Brandon et al. 
(2004) 
333 bond issuers  USA Polychotomous Moody’s bond 
rating 
FEERATIO  0.023  Negative and significant  
 
Dhaliwal et al. 
(2008) 
560 bond issues  USA TSPREAD: the yield on the first 
bond issue  
FEERATIO 2.11 Positive and significant 
Krishnan et al. 
(2005) 
2,816 firm-years  USA Three-day market-adjusted 
abnormal returns (CAR)  
FEERATIO  -3.22  Negative and significant.  
Gul et al. 
(2006) 
840 firm-years  Australia RTN: Holding returns from 9 
months before the balance sheet 
date to 3 months after.  
FEERATIO  
 
-2.46 
 
 
Negative and significant. 
Nam (2006) 4,129 firm-years  USA Cost of capital 
 
FEERATIO  
 
-3.11 
 
Negative and significant   
 Francis and Ke 
(2006) 
16,243 firm-years USA CAR FEERATIO -3.96 Negative and significant  
Chin et al. 
(2007) 
254 firm-years  Taiwan Forecast bias  
Forecast accuracy   
FEERATIO 
 
2.46  FEERATIO is positively 
associated with optimistic and 
inaccurate forecasts.  Ghosh et al. 
(2008) 
8,938 firm-years  USA CAR  FEERATIO  -5.93  Negative and significant  
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Notes:  
Bold and italicized reported statistics are t-values while the remaining are p-values.  
a
 I use absolute DACCR (|DACCR|) as the relevant FRQ proxy. The reason for such an exercise is that companies could engage in both upward 
 as well as downward earnings management and therefore |DACCR| seems to be the right proxy. Frankel et al. (2002) and many other 
 studies also reported coefficient and stat values for income-increasing as well as income-decreasing accruals separately (e.g., Table 6, 
 panel B in Frankel et al). In addition to the DACCR, many studies also included “loss avoidance” and “small increase in earnings” as two 
 other earnings management proxies. I exclude these two earnings benchmark thresholds from meta analysis because DACCR is 
 considered to be the primary earnings management proxy.     
b
 Ashbaugh et al. (2003) replicate Frankel et al. (2002) but model |DACCR| as performance-adjusted DACCR.   .  
c
 Reynolds et al. control for asset growth and fail to find any effect of NAF on DACCR. 
d Ferguson et al. (2006) also include two other proxies for earnings management besides |DACCR|. Firstly, they use a variable CRIT coded as 1 
 if client accounting practices were subject to regulatory investigation; and the variables RSTA, coded 1 if the client financial statements 
 were restated; and zero otherwise.  
e
 Magdy (2007) reports moderating effect of earnings persistence and fee ratio on earnings management and finds a positive and significant 
 effect of such variable on earnings management proxy.  
f
 Dee et al. (2006) include S&P500 as the moderating variable and find a negative but insignificant relationship between DACCR and the 
 interaction variable. 
g Huang et al. (2007) break down FEERATIO into audit-related fee ratio (AFRATIO), tax ratio (TAXRATIO) and other fee ratio (OTHRATIO). I 
 include only TAXRATIO as the appropriate fee construct because descriptive statistics in Huang et al (2007) Table 1 reveals that 
 TAXRATIO is the largest component of FEERATIO. Furthermore, the PCAOB is of the opinion that provision of tax services would be 
 viewed most negatively by the market participants.   
h Two approaches to measuring conservatism are popular in extant accounting research. Reversal of earnings-based conservatism measures and   
Basu (1997)-type reverse regression measures.  The Basu (1997) approach is the dominant model and, hence, I report stat values derived 
from this model.  
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Table 2: Calculation of effect size (FEERATIO as the primary independent variable) 
 
FRQ  Author Stat value N ES ESz W (df) SE W*ES W*ES2 
EM Frankel et al. (2002) 0.01 
 
2472  
 
0.05 
 
0.05 2469 0.02 123.45 6.17 
 Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 0.02 
 
3069  
 
0.04 0.04 3066 0.02 122.64 4.91 
 Chung and Kallapur (2004) 0.17 1871   -0.03 -0.03 1868 0.02 -56.04 1.68 
 Larcker &  Richardson (2004)  1.69  5103   0.02 0.02 5100 0.01 102 2.04 
 Reynolds et al. (2004) 0.233 2507  -0.02 -0.02 2504 0.02 -50.08 1.00 
 Ferguson et al. (2004) 0.001 
0.06 
  610 
  610 
0.13 0.13 607 0.04 78.91 10.26 
 Antle et al.(2006) 2.47 2,294 0.05 0.05 2291 0.02 114.55 5.73 
 Magdy (2006) 0.002   996 0.10 0.10   993 0.03 99.30 9.93 
 Dee et al. (2006) 0.60 
 
  384  
   
-0.027 -0.03 381 0.05 -11.43 0.28 
 Huang et al. (2007) 0.12  
 
6,891 
 
-0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 6888 0.01 -137.76 2.76 
 Coulton et al. (2007) -0.85  4,021  -0.01 -0.01 4018 0.02 -40.18 0.40 
 Habib & Islam (2007) 0.47  
 
  530  
  
-0.03 -0.03   527 0.04 -15.81 0.47 
 Mitra (2007) 0.24 71 0.14 0.14 68 0.12 9.52 1.33 
 
Koh et al. (2009) -0.76 1260 -0.02 -0.02 1257 0.03 -25.14 0.51 
Audit Opinion Wines (1994) -1.83      76  0.21 0.21    73 0.12 15.33 3.22 
 Craswell (1997) 0.79   3,441   -0.0002 -0.0002 3438 -0.02 -0.69 0.00 
 Lennox (1999) 2.15 2,266  -0.05 -0.05 2263 0.02 -113.15 5.66 
 Sharma & Shidhu  (2001) 0.049      49  0.29 0.30    46 0.15 13.34 3.87 
 DeFond et al. (2002) 0.49  1,158  0.02 0.02 1155 0.03 23.1 0.46 
 Firth (2002) -1.96 1,112  0.06 0.06 1109 0.03 66.54 3.99 
 Raghunandan (2003) 3.92   300 0.22 0.22    297 0.06 65.34 14.37 
 Mishra et al. (2005) 7.78 248 0.45 0.48    245 0.06 110.25 49.61 
 Hay et al. (2006) 
 
0.52 
 
 643 
     
0.03 0.03   640 0.04 19.2 0.58 
 Pe et al. (2006) -1.67 627 0.07 0.07    624 0.04 43.68 3.06 
 Robinson (2008) 0.05 209 0.07 0.07 206 0.07 14.42 1.01 
 
Fargher and Jiang (2008) 0.003  5,113 0.04 0.04 5110 0.01 204.4 8.18 
 
Callaghan et al. (2009) 0.68 92 -0.07 -0.07 89 0.07 -6.23 0.44 
 
Liu et al. (2009) 3.60 194 0.25 0.26 191 0.04 47.75 11.94 
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Conservatism  Ruddock et al. (2005) 1.23 3,746 -0.02 -0.02 3743 0.02 -74.86 1.50 
 
 
Zhang and Emanuel (2008) -0.956   352 0.05 0.05 349 0.05 17.45 0.87 
 
Cahan and Zhang (2006) -2.26 1639 -0.058 -0.06 1636 0.02 -94.88 5.50 
Restatement Kinney et al. (2004) 0.04 934 -0.07 -0.07 931 0.03 -65.17 4.56 
 
Agrawal & Chada (2005) 0.15    318 0.08 0.08 315 0.06 25.2 2.02 
 
Bloomfield & Shackman (2008) -0.56   500 -0.03 -0.03  497 0.04 -14.91 0.45 
Capital mkt. Brandon et al. (2004) 0.02   333 0.12 0.13    330 0.06 39.6 4.75 
 Krishnan et al. (2005) -3.22  2,816 0.06 0.06 2813 0.02 168.78 10.13 
 Gul et al. (2006) -2.46   840 0.08 0.08    837 0.03 66.96 5.36 
 Nam (2006) -3.11 4,129 -0.05 -0.05 4126 0.02 -206.3 10.32 
 Francis & Ke (2006) -3.96 16243 0.03 0.03 16240 0.03 487.2 14.62 
 Chin et al. (2007) 2.46    254 0.15 0.15    251 0.06 37.65 5.65 
 Dhaliwal et al. (2008) 2.11   560 0.09 0.09    557 0.04 50.13 4.51 
 
Ghosh et al. (2008) -5.93  8,938 0.06 0.06 8935 0.01 536.1 32.17 
 
  89,209   89,083  1791.12 256.27 
 
Mean effect size        0.02  
 
S.E. 
 
     0.0033  
 
Z-stat       6.06*  
 
Lower bound       0.014  
 
Upper bound       0.026  
 
Homogeneity test       220.26  
 
Within group Q ( Table 3)        190.16  
 
Between group Q†       30.1  
 
Between group Q explains       14%  
 
†Group-specific Q (within group) values from Table 3 are added together [44.39+90.02+3.82+5.30+46.63] = 190.16.  Q values derived from 
homogeneity test is then subtracted from this value [220.26-190.16] giving a between group Q value of 30.1 
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Figure 2: Effect size distribution across studies selected for meta-analysis. Distribution of effect sizes are much more skewed for audit opinion 
component of FRQ compared to earnings management and capital market effect component of FRQ.  
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Table 3 
Component of FRQ proxies and effect size analysis (within-group variability) 
 
FRQ Earnings management 
(14 studies) 
Audit opinion/auditor 
ratification (14 studies) 
Earnings conservatism 
(3 studies) 
Earnings restatement 
(3 studies) 
Capital market 
effect (8 studies) 
Mean E.S. 0.0098 0.0325 -0.027 -0.03 0.034 
S.E. 0.0056 0.0080 0.013 0.024 0.0054 
Z-Score 1.75 4.06* -2.05** 1.25 7.70* 
Upper limit 0.02 0.05 -0.0015 0.02 0.03 
Lower limit -0.0012 0.02 -0.052 -0.08 0.05 
Q values 44.39 90.02 3.82 5.30 46.63 
 
Table 3 reports weighted effect size of each FRQ proxy group to determine whether there are any quantitative or qualitative differences in the 
association between NAF and FRQ across the groups. The analysis reported in Table 3 shows that the mean effect size is significant for earnings 
management and capital market groups. These two categories constitute fifty four percent of the selected studies.  
 
*,** denotes statistical significance at 1% and 5% level respectively (two-tailed test).  
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Table 4 
Calculation of effect size and associated statistics using total fee as the fee proxy  
Panel A 
FRQ  Author Stat value N ES ESz W (df) SE W*ES W*ES2 
EM Frankel et al. (2002) 0.16 2472  
 
0.03 0.03 2469 0.02 74 2.22 
 Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 0.59 3069  
 
0.01 0.01 3066 0.02 31 0.31 
 Chung and Kallapur (2004) 0.381 1871   -0.02 -0.02 1868 0.02 -37 0.75 
 Larcker &  Richardson 
(2004)  
-6.21 5103 -0.09 -0.09 5100 0.01 -459 41.31 
 Reynolds et al. (2004) 0.35 2507  0.02 0.02 2504 0.02 50.08 1.00 
 Dee et al. (2006) 0.022   384  
   
0.12 0.12   381 0.05 45.72 5.49 
 Coulton et al. (2007) -1.48 4,021  -0.02 -0.02 4018 0.02 -80.36 1.61 
 Habib & Islam (2007) 0.14   530  
  
0.07 0.07   527 0.04 37 2.58 
 Mitra (2007) 0.31 71 0.13 0.13 68 0.12 8.84 1.15 
Audit opinion 
studies 
DeFond et al. (2002) 0.12 1,158  0.05 0.05 1155 0.03 57.75 2.89 
 
Callaghan et al. (2009)  0.83 92 0.03 0.03     89 0.03 2.67 0.08 
Capital market  Brandon et al. (2004) 0.001   333 0.18 0.182    330 0.06 59.4 10.69 
 
Krishnan et al. (2005) -1.68 2,816 0.03 0.03 2813 0.02 84.39 2.53 
 Chin et al. (2007) 0.96   254 0.06 0.06    251 0.06 15.06 0.90 
 Dhaliwal et al. (2008) 2.45   560 0.10 0.10    557 0.04 56 5.57 
 
Ghosh et al. (2008) -4.19 8,938 0.04 0.04 8935 0.01 357.4 14.30 
 
     34131  301.91 93.37 
 
Mean ES        0.0088  
 
S.E.       0.0054  
 
Z-stat       1.63  
 
Lower bound       -0.0018  
 
Upper bound       0.0193  
 
Homogeneity test       90.71  
 
Within-Group Q       59.59  
 
Between group Q       31.12  
 
Between group Q explains        34%  
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Panel B 
Component of FRQ proxies and effect size analysis (total fee as the fee proxy) 
 
 
FRQ proxies Mean effect size S.E. Z-statistics Upper limit Lower limit Q values 
       
Earnings management -0.017 0.0071 2.39** -0.0027 -0.03 50.95 
Audit opinion/auditor ratification 0.05 0.02 1.71 0.010 -0.007 0.04 
Capital market effect  0.04 0.0088 5.04* 0.06 0.03 8.6 
 
Note: 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argued that fee ratio does not capture the economic importance of the client when total client fees are immaterial to the 
audit firms. I also performed meta-analysis of the studies that included total fee rather than fee ratio as the primary independent variable to explain 
different FRQ outcomes.  
*,*** denotes statistical significance at 1% and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed test). 
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